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THE DUTY TO READ AN INSURANCE POLICY IN
WASHINGTON*
WILLARD J. WRIGHTt
THE CONTRACT RULE

In general, the law of contracts asserts that, in the absence of fraud
or mutual mistake, a person, who accepts a writing known by him
to be contractual with an intention to become a party thereto, is conclusively bound by all of its terms and will not be permitted in any
action thereafter arising on such instrument to deny that he had knowledge of its terms.' It will not do for a man to enter into a contract
and, when called upon to respond to its obligations, to say that he did
not read it when he signed it, or did not know what it contained. "If
this were permitted contracts would not be worth the paper on which
they were written. A contractor must stand by the words of his contract; and, if he will not read what he signs, he alone is responsible for
his omission." 2 The rigor and harshness of this rule is at times apparent, but, it is said to be a matter of policy and that the integrity
of contracts demands that the rule be rigidly enforced by the courts.'
However, this is the rule only in the absence of fraud or mutual mistake or where the other party to the contract knew of the signer's
4
ignorance and fraudulently induced it or took advantage of it.

*This article was submitted as a thesis for a Juris Doctor degree from
the University of Washington in 1939.
tOf the Seattle Bar.

'5 WILLISTON AND THOMPSON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1937) § 1577, p. 4408,
citing Long v. McAvoy, 133 Wash. 472, 233 Pac. 930, 44 A. L. R. 483 (1925).
Also VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) § 71, p. 215, citing Boylan v. Hot
Springs Railroad Co., 132 U. S. 146 (1889).
2Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U. S. 45, 51 (1875), wherein defendant was
a shareholder in plaintiff corporation and was held bound to the contract
in his share certificate upon his acceptance thereof, whether he read it
or not. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS

(1932) § 70, p. 73, states the rule that:

"One who makes a written offer which is accepted, or who manifests
acceptance of the terms of a writing which he should reasonably understand to be an offer or proposed contract, is bound by the contract, though
ignorant of the terms of the writing or of its proper interpretation."
3Furst v. Merritt, 190 N. C. 397, 130 S. E. 40 (1925).
'Rosenbaum v. Evans, 63 Wash. 506, 115 Pac. 1054 (1911), which allowed
reformation of a deed where mutual mistake of the parties was established
by "clear and convincing evidence". Carlson v. Druse, 79 Wash. 542, 140
Pac. 570 (1914), where the plaintiff had delayed bringing any action for
two years to reform a deed which did "not correctly state the agreement
which the parties actually made"; the court again allowed reformation
because "there has been a material and mutual mistake". (In Note (1926)
45 A. L. R. 700, 704, it is said that this latter case "practically denies the
doctrine that negligence will bar reformation.") See generally, 5 WILLISTON
AND THOMPSON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1937) §§ 1535 to 1600F inclusive; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) §§ 504, 505.
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Washington follows this general contract rule5 but the court appears
willing to mollify its hardship in some instances by liberally construing
the term "fraud". Thus in Stone v. Moody 6 the plaintiffs signed a
contract without reading it and the court allowed them a recission
on the ground that the contract contained such an "unconscionable"
clause that it was plain the plaintiffs would never have agreed to it if
they had known of it.7 Unless it can be said that the defendantwho read the contract to the plaintiffs and omitted to read the clause
in question-induced the plaintiffs not to read the contract, the result
of the case seems contrary to the proper rule. But under the Washington view this would probably constitute fraud, since facts or circumstances tending to show fraud or mistake have been enumerated in
Washington as "inability to read or understand the language of the
contract, a relation of trust or confidence between the parties, or some
artifice used to obtain the signature of the party or prevent him from
reading the contract." 8
When it is shown that there has been no fraud practiced by the other
party and that the contract was not founded on a mutual mistake of the
parties, one who has failed to read the contract is bound thereby at
law and in equity. He will not be able to obtain a reformation.9 He
*In the leading Washington case, Washington Central Imp. Co. v. Newlands, 11 Wash. 212, 39 Pac. 366 (1895), the court rendered the following
much quoted phrase: "If people having eyes refuse to open them and
look, and having understanding refuse to exercise it, they must not complain, when they accept and act upon the representation of other people,
if their venture does not prove successful. Written contracts would become too unstable if courts were to annul them on representations of
this kind." See also Walsh v. Bushell, 26 Wash. 576, 67 Pac. 216 (1901);
Griffith v. Strand, 19 Wash. 686, 54 Pac. 613 (1898); West Seattle Land &
Imp. Co. v. Herren, 16 Wash. 665, 48 Pac. 341 (1897); Samson v. Beale, 27
Wash. 557, 68 Pac. 180 (1902); Sherman v. Sweeny, 29 Wash. 321, 69 Pac.
1117 (1902); Lake v. Churchill, 39 Wash. 318, 81 Pac. 849 (1905); Walsh v.
Meyer, 40 Wash. 650, 82 Pac. 938 (1905); Hubenthal v. Spokane & Inland
Ry. Co., 43 Wash. 677, 86 Pac. 955 (1906).
'41 Wash. 680, 84 Pac. 617 (1906).
'This view of the court seems based wholly on sympathy in disregard
of the strict rule. The court said: "(the plaintiffs) were people of, or
above, average intelligence . . . Ordinarily, when people of average
intelligence sign instruments which they have an opportunity to read, but
do not, they should not be afterwards permitted to say that they did not
know what they were signing. If this contract did not contain a provision
which we deem to be absolutely unconscionable and one which no intelligent vendor would have subscribed to, we would not be disposed to listen
to any claim on the part of these appellants (plaintiffs) that they did not
know of the contents of this contract."
Hubenthal v. Spokane & Inland Ry. Co., 43 Wash. 677, 687, 86 Pac.
955, 959 (1906).
'Kearns-Gorsuch Bottle Co. v. Hartford Co., 1 F. (2d) 318 -(S. D. N. Y.
1921); Burt v. Los Angeles Olive Growers Assn., 175 Cal. 668, 166 Pac. 993
(1917); Grieve v. Grieve,. 15 Wyo. 358, 89 Pac. 569, 9 L. R. A. (Nr.s.) 1211
(1907). But see Gilroy v. Strauss Building & Realty Co., 157 N. Y. Supp.
162 (Sup. Ct. 1915), where the court said: "The established law in this
state is that the negligence of the party who seeks the reformation of the
instrument, whether in failing to read the instrument before he signed it
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cannot successfully rescind. 10 Nor will equity give him relief when the
other party seeks specific performance."' In actions at law the nonreading party is bound in silence by the parol evidence rule."
Since an insurance policy is a contract the question at once presents
3
itself whether this rigid contract rule will be or is applied to it.' As
opposed to such application, writers have suggested that since the
insurance contract is unique in character, the ordinary rigid contract
rules should not be strictly applied. One writer contends that an insurance contract is not essentially a "bargaining" agreement customary
in trade, since the terms of the contract are fixed by the expert insurer
alone and the "bargaining" amounts to no more than determining
whether the inexperienced applicant will take it or leave it." Another
writer calls it a contract of "adhesion", as the insured merely "adheres"
to it with little choice as to its terms.'t
or in failing thereafter to note the error for a long period of time is no
bar to a suit for the reformation of the instrument."; citing Smith v. Smith,
134 N. Y. 62, 31 N. E. 258 (1892); Wilcox v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 176
N. Y. 115, 68 N. E. 153 (1903).
' 0McElroy v. Maxwell, 101 Mo. 294, 14 S. W. 1 (1890).
"'Kearns-Gorsuch Bottle Co. v. Hartford Co., 1 F. (2d) 318 (S.D. N. Y.
1921); Heyward v. Bradley, 179 Fed. 325 (C. C. A. 4th, 1910), where the
court allowed specific performance even though defendant's intention was
different from that actually expressed in the contract. Harringon v. Heder,
109 N. J. Eq. 528, 158 Atl. 496 (1932), where a clause in a land sale contract was not completely understood yet the vendor was entitled to specific
performance. However, this equitable remedy of specific performance is
quite discretionary with the court and may be denied in a case where the
mistaken party would not be allowed to reform or rescind his agreement.
See generally, 5 WLLISTON AND THOMPSON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1937)
§ 1427.
'"See Note 46, infra.
3
' VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) p. 215. In Foster v. Pioneer Mutual
Ins. Assn., 37 Wash. 288, 292, 79 Pac. 798, 799 (1905), the court said: "People

are as a rule not informed concerning the technical rules governing insurance contracts. In the nature of things, they must and do rely largely
upon the agents, not only because of the latter's superior knowledge upon
the subject, but also, because they regard the agents as coming from their
principals clothed with authority. For these reasons the cases are numerous
which held that, whei an agent acts with knowledge of the facts, he
is the agent of the insurer, and that his knowledge becomes, in law, that
of his principal, and binds the latter when the insured has no knowledge
of the limitations upon the agent's authority."
Thus it is suggested by "W. S. A." in Note (1932) 81 A. L. R. 833, 874:
"In many respects, insurance is contracted for in a manner unlike that
followed in the making of ordinary commercial contracts. This is especially true of life, health and accident policies, which are sold usually
under the high pressure of effective salesmanship. Furthermore, experience would justify a statement that, to many persons, the purchase of
insurance is, like the purchase of any ordinary commodity, a matter
involving other considerations than those entering into the closing of a
contract... These are the reasons which have led a majority of the courts

to take the position that the insured will be given protection notwithstanding the fact that if he had been less trustful, less gullible, or more
alert, the insurer would have been prevented from paying a loss under a
risk which it would never have assumed if it had known the facts."
"Patterson, The Delivery of a Life Insurance Policy (1919), 33 H~Av.
L. R v. 198, 222.
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A more persuasive argument is made by one court which compares
the sale of an insurance policy to the sale of an article of merchandise. 5 It is suggested that the contract rule is in result the same as
the outmoded doctrine of caveat emptor when applied to the sale of
insurance. The court asserts that the doctrine of caveat emptor should
not apply, but that the insured has a right to rely on the presumption
that the policy he receives is in accordance with his application whether
oral or not. Pursuing this theory, one writer has suggested' 6 that an
action by the insured for reformation or rescission or a defense by the
insured to an action for a premium payment is analogous to a claim
by a vendee in the law of sales of a breach of an implied warranty of
reasonable fitness for an intended purpose.' 7 Hence, should the policy
delivered not conform to the oral statements of the insured made to
the insurer's agent concerning the coverage desired or should it contain alterations which the agent may make in his zeal to sell the
policy, the insured should have the remedies accorded to a vendee under
the Uniform Sales Act and case law.
A third theory suggests that in a suit-for reformation, the insured
cannot be found so negligent as to warrant a denial of relief for a
failure to read his policy because "the prevailing business custom is
for the insured to rely upon the accuracy, skill and good faith of the
agent of the insurer'" and that it is not necessary to examine either
the application or the policy in order to detect any mistake on the
part of the insurer."'19
Tim RtLE OF THE HAYES CASE
Despite the plausibility of the arguments advanced to deny the application of strict contract rules to the insurance policy, the Washington Court has clearly stated its view on this question in Hayes v.
Automobile Insurance Exchange2 0 'There, the insured applied for
automobile insurance, and the agent of the insurer orally asked him
"'Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co. v. Chambers, 24 Ariz. 86, 206 Pac. 1081
(1922).
"Comment (1925), 35 YALE L. J. 203, 208.
"ITEm. RxV. STAT. § 5836-15 (1); 1 WILLISTON, SALES (2d ed. 1924) §§
227, 235.
"Pfiester v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 85 Kan. 97, 116 Pac. 245 (1911),
where the court said: "It is not carelessness or imprudence in fact, as
people in general understand those terms, for the applicant to take it for
granted that the agent will accurately and truthfully set down the result
of the negotiations. If he fail to do so, good sense and common justice'
regard the company as responsible, and not the insured. The subject,
therefore, is sui generis, and the rules of a legal system devised to govern
the formation of ordinary contracts between man and man cannot be
mechanically applied to it"
'VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) p. 215.

"126 Wash. 487, 218 Pac. 252 (1923), aff'd on rehearing, 129 Wash. 202,
224 Pac. 594 (1924).
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several questions which he answered truthfully. The agent, however,
unknown to the insured, then filled in the written application with
certain false statements to the effect that: the automobile had not
been in a wreck prior to the application; another company had not
refused or cancelled insurance on the automobile; and there existed
no unmentioned incumbrance on the automobile. The policy was
issued on this application which also contained a warranty of the truth
of the statements in the policy "on acceptance of this policy" by the
insured. The policy further cautioned the insured to "read your policy", which the insured failed to do. The court found that the insured
did not act in good faith and denied recovery in an action on the
policy, reversing the trial court's findings, saying:
"Whether he read it or not is immaterial. It was his duty
to read it, and the law says that he did read it. It showed
statements which he knew were untrue and without which he
could not have obtained the insurance. It becomes immaterial
whether or not originally in the application the blanks were
filled in by the appellant's agent without respondent's knowledge; in effect, they were the respondent's own statements
when he received the policy containing
the instruction 'Read
21
your policy' and retained it."
This ruling may be attacked on several grounds. In the first place
the facts show that the policy was issued and delivered to a bank
to secure an indebtedness on the automobile, and the insured actually
never saw the policy or application after he had signed the latter in
blank form. This alone would seem to cast sufficient doubt on the
question of the knowledge of the insured such as to require a remand
for new trial rather than a reversal of the finding of the trial court,
since the question seems to be wholly one of fact for the Jury and not
one of law.
In the second place, this ruling bases an intent to deceive upon the
mere constructive knowledge of the insured. It is to be remembered
that in 1911, the legislature passed a statute which declared that a
misrepresentation or false warranty will not avoid or defeat the policy
unless made with the intent to deceive.2 2 In the absence of proof of
actual knowledge of the insured, it would seem highly undesirable
to predicate an intent to deceive upon a mere failure to read the policy
and the presumption of knowledge alone. It is submitted that the
purpose of the legislature in passing this statute was aimed at the subjective intent of the insured and not an implied intent. 2
Thirdly, although the court might possibly substantiate its position
-'Hayes v. Automobile Insurance Exchange, 126 Wash. 487, 488, 218 Pac.
252, 253 (1923).
"REM. REV. STAT. § 7078.
'For a full discussion see Bloch, Intent to Deceive in Applications for
Insurance Policies (1935), 10 WASH. L. REV. 78.
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on the ground of fraudulent concealment of material facts, this point
was not considered. Furthermore, there is a line of Washington decisions which holds:
"that a policy will not be held void nor the warranty clause in
a policy held to have been breached for acts known to the
agent before the application for the policy was signed, where
the insured fully and truthfully related the facts to the solidfalse answers were written in the application by the
tor and
' 24
agent.
In answer to this it may be argued that in the Hayes case the insured
did not "fully relate the facts", but the reply to this contention is
that the insured did answer all the questions put to insured by the
agent and answered "fully and truthfully". The Washington court
has not required more and in fact has expressly held that the failure
of the insurer's agent to inquire as to material facts will constitute a
"waiver" thereof. 25 Therefore, under these holdings if the agent had
knowledge of the falsity it will estop the insurer from setting up the
alleged breach, or where the agent failed to inquire the insurer will not
be allowed later to question the truth of a statement in the policy. On
either holding it would seem that the Hayes case could well have
reached the opposite conclusion. This is the position taken by the
26
dissenting judges.
Nevertheless, assuming that the facts in the Hayes case were such
as to deny a waiver by or estoppel of the insurer, the rule in that case
seems to be that the insured is chargeable with knowledge of the contents of the policy whether he has read it or not, since he has a duty
to read it and is presumed to have done so. It is seen that this is the
contract rule applied to the insurance contract. On what basis does
the Washington court justify this application to the insurance cases?
In the rehearing of the Hayes case, 6 the majority opinion depends
largely on the decisions rendered by four other jurisdictions, which,
in the last analysis, appear to give rather slender support to the Washington holding.
'Mesterman v. Home Mut. Ins. Co., 5 Wash. 524, 32 Pac. 458 (1893);
Hart v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 9 Wash. 620, 38 Pac. 213 (1894); Foster v.
Pioneer Mut. Ins. Assn., 37 Wash. 288, 79 Pac. 798 (1905); Staats v. Pioneer
Ins. Assn., 55 Wash. 51, 104 Pac. 185 (1909); Bothell v. Nat. Casualty Co.,
59 Wash. 209, 109 Pac. 590 (1910); Turner v. American Casualty Co., 69
Wash. 154, 124 Pac. 486 (1912)-where insured told agent of insurer that
he had an "atrophied leg" but agent wrote in application warranting
"no bodily infirmity except a slight weakness in ankle". Insured in all
other respects also gave full and correct answers and afterwards signed
the application. Held: For the insured.
"Dooly v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 16 Wash. 155, 47 Pac. 507 (1896); Pioneer Savings & Loan Co. v. Providence Wash. Ins. Co., 17 Wash. 175, 49 Pac.
231 (1897), 38 L. R. A. 397 (1898); Neher v. Western Assur. Co., 40 Wash.
157, 82 Pac. 166 (1905); Gregerson v. Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 99 Wash. 639,
170 Pac. 331 (1918).
1129 Wash. 202, 224 Pac. 594 (1924).
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The first case is one from the United States Supreme Court, Lumber
Underwriters v. Rife.2 1 In rendering the decision, Mr. Justice Holmes
used the following language which the Washington court incorporated
in the Hayes case:
"No rational theory of contract law can be made that does
of the instrument
not hold the assured to know the contents
28
to which he seeks to hold the other part.

These words were applied to a set of facts wherein it appeared that
the insured had actual knowledge of the discrepancy between the truth
and the warranty in the policy. Since the Hayes doctrine is based upon
constructive knowledge, the actual knowledge in this case would seem
to destroy its authority for the Washington holding.
The second case and the one on which the Washington court mainly
relies is a Missouri decision, Modern Woodmen of America v. Angle,2"
in which the insurer instituted. the action to cancel the policy before
any loss had occurred. The court permitted cancellation, using language
which the Washington court adopted verbatim, 30 as follows:
"Now it is well established in the law of insurance that,
when the agent has written down untrue answers to such
questions, even though it be done without the knowledge of
the insured, and the insured is furnished a copy of the application containing such untrue answers annexed to the policy,
he is afterwards estopped from denying knowledge thereof.
The doctrine, of course, proceeds upon the theory that it is
the duty of the insured to use reasonable diligence in discovering the contents of the contract, and it is said, upon
discovering the same it becomes his duty to notify the company of such fraud perpetrated upon both himself and the
insurer. At any rate, if he held the policy, referring in apt
terms to the warranties contained in the application annexed,
for a reasonable time, he is conclusively presumed to know the
contents of the contract and the untruthful answers plainly
written in the application, and is thereby estopped to assert
that he had no knowledge on the subject.""1
The distinction between the Missouri and Washington cases is that
in the former no loss of the property covered by the policy had been
suffered by the insured, while in the Hayes case the loss had been
incurred. Hence, to follow the contract rule in the Missouri case would
impose no real hardship on the insured except a mere loss of coverage
by one particular insurer. This distinction seems to be of importance
to the Missouri court for in the later cases32 involving facts similar
"237 U. S. 605 (1915).
2Id. at 606.
'127 Mo. App. 94, 104 S. W. 297 (1907).
'In Hayes v. Automobile Insurance Exchange, 129 Wash. 202, 203, 224
Pac. 594, 595 (1924).
"'127Mo. App. 94, 104 S. W. 297, 303 (1907).
*"La Font v. Home Ins. Co., 193 Mo. App. 543, 182 S. W. 1029 (1916);
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to those in the Hayes case, where the insured is suing to recover on
the policy, the Missouri court has permitted recovery and refused
to apply the rule of the Angle case.
The third case cited and quoted by the Hayes case, Moore v. State
Insurance Co.,3" an Iowa decision, ignores the issue raised in the Hayes
case and involves the question of "assent" of the insured to the conditions of the policy without his signing. There was no evidence or
allegation that the insured was unaware of the presence of this provision in the policy nor that insured failed to read his policy., Hence,
on the facts and allegations, this case furnishes meager support, if any
at all, for the Washington holding.
The fourth and final case on which the Washington court relies
is the California case of Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. IrrigationCo." It is
submitted that this case is not in point, since it does not involve a claim
by the insurer of a breach of warranty by the insured. Moreover, subsequent California cases involving the particular point of the Hayes case
wherein the insured failed to read the policy, have held in favor of the
insured.33
THE APPLICATION OF THE RULE OF THE HAYES CASE
Regardless of the questionable grounds for the rule of the Hayes
case, it is apparent" that the Washington court is not inclined to
alter its position, and it accordingly becomes necessary to investigate
the effect of that rule upon actions for reformation upon the policy.
When the insured seeks reformation the effect of that rule would be,
as under the strict contract rule, to presume that thc insured knew
the terms of his policy and to deny the relief of reformation. Thus, in
the recent Washington case of Carew, Shaw & Bernasconi v. General
Casualty Co.,36 the agent of the insurer made an oral agreement to
insure the insured's safe against burglary. Pending the issuance of
the policy, the agent issued a temporary binder which covered the
entire safe. When the policy was issued it covered only an inner
chest thereof, and the insurer refused to pay when a burglary of the
contents of the safe occurred and the inner chest was untouched. The
insured sought a reformation of the policy which he did not read. In
Shockey v. Fidelity Ins. Co. of N. Y. -Mo. App. -, 191 S. W. 1049 (1917);
Zeilman v. Central Mut. Ins. Assn., 224 Mo. App. 145, 22 S. W. (2d) 88
(1929)
172 Iowa 414, 34 N. W. 183 (1887).
"161 Cal. 466, 119 Pac. 646 (1912).
'Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Arenbrust, 85 Cat. App. 263, 259 Pac.
121 (1927); Ames v. Employers Casualty Co., 16 Cal. App. (2d) 255, 60
P. (2d) 347, 352 (1936), which declared in an action for reformation:
"An insured has the right to rely on the presumption that the policy he
receives is in accordance with his application, and his failure to read it
will not relieve the insurer or its agent from the duty of so writing it."
19 Wash. 329, 65 P. (2d) 689 (1937).
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denying relief, the court said:
"Appellant (insured) is presumed and is required to know
the provisions of the insurance contract, as it would any other
written contract into which it enters. It will not do . . . to

say that he did not read the policy. Whether he read the
policy is immaterial. It was appellant's duty to read the policy
and the law says that it was done. (Citing the Hayes case.)""7
This language is used to support a dictum of the court to the effect
that even if there had been fraud or mutual mistake in this case,
reformation would still be denied on the ground that the insured was
negligent in not reading his policy. 8 Such a rule is decidedly a harsh
one and not supported by the great weight of authority. 9 It is well
to note the language of one Washington decision on this point which
held that "mere failure of either party to a deed to read it" is not a
bar to an action for reformation. 40 It seems that if the Washington
court is willing to overlook the failure of a party to read his deed, that
it would be justified in allowing reformation under similar circumstances in insurance cases. Moreover, it is said to be the uniform rule
in insurance cases that the failure of the insured to read his policy is
not considered to be such negligence or laches as to deprive him of the
remedy of reformation. 41 In view of the above holdings, it would
seem that the dictum of the Washington court in the Carew case is
erroneous to the extent of denying reformation of a mutual mistake
in an insurance policy where the insured failed to read his policy.42
Applied to waiver and estoppel, the effect of the Hayes doctrine is
yet to be determined, since no case directly involving either has been
before the court. Despite the failure of the court to make a distinction
between the operation of a waiver and the operation of an estoppel
"Id. at 341, 65 P. (2d) at 694.
"Carew, Shaw & Bernasconi v. General Casualty Co., 189 Wash. 329,
340, 65 P. (2d) 689, 694 (1937), the court said: "Even if we did not agree

with the trial court that the policy truly reflects the quotation made to
Shaw, the negligence of appellant would defeat its action for reformation."
3"It has certainly never been announced as the law in this state that
the mere omission to read or know the contents of a written instrument
should bar any relief by way of a reformation of the instrument on
account of mistake or fraud." Lewitt & Co. v. Jewelers' Safety Fund Soc.,
249 N. Y. 217, 164 N. E. 29 (1928); see also West v. Suda, 69 Conn. 60, 36
Atl. 1015 (1897); Boulden v. Wood, 96 Md. 332, 53 Atl. 911 (1903); Bradshaw
v. Provident Trust Co., 81 Ore. 55, 158 Pac. 274 (1916).
"Rosenbaum v. Evans, 63 Wash. 506, 115 Pac. 1054 (1911).
'VANcE, INsURANcE (2d ed. 1930) p. 218: "Assuming that the circumstances are such as to entitle the insured to reformation, it seems to be
uniformly held that the insured may, by parol evidence, show what
actually occurred in the making of the contract, and that he may introduce
evidence to the effect that he has not read the policy in support of his
allegation that it had been accepted under mistaken apprehension as to
its terms."
42-However, the court probably reached the correct result since it was
unwilling to find a mutual mistake proved by clear, cogent and convincing
evidence.
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in the insurance cases,'" it is clear that before there can be any waiver
by the insurer's agent, he must have either actual or apparent authority
to waive." In order to protect itself from a waiver made by any agent,
the insurer generally inserts a non-waiver clause in the application
which usually states that only certain officials at the home-office may
waive or alter the terms of the policy or that no waiver or alteration
will be valid unless added in writing to the policy with the approval of
the home-office. 5 It is generally held in conformance with the rule
in the Hayes case, that such a clause in the application must be considered as communicated to the insured whether actually known to
him or not.4 8 Hence, in the case of a claim of waiver it is quite possible to have the Hayes doctrine prevent the assured from asserting a
waiver on the ground that he had presumed knowledge of the agent's
lack of authority. But it is held that if, in fact, the agent does have
the power to waive, the non-waiver clause will not bind the insured
whether he read it or not.47 There are also other situations beyond the

48
Outscope of this paper, where the non-waiver clause is ineffective.
"One Washington decision appears to give the proper definition in saying: "A waiver is the voluntary relinquishment of a known right and may
be either express or implied. It is effected by any words that express or
acts that imply an intention to give up the power to rescind the contract
or the privilege of asserting a known defense to an action brought thereon.
An estoppel is a preclusion by act or conduct from asserting a right which
might otherwise have existed, to the detriment and prejudice of another
who in reliance on such act or conduct, has acted upon it."-per Steinert,

J., in Reynolds v. Travelers Ins. Co., 176 Wash. 36, 45, 28 P. (2d) 310, 314

(1934).
It has been said that a true waiver is a consensual arrangement between insurer and insured in the nature of a contract, while an estoppel is
founded in tort rather than on contract. VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930)
pp. 469, 519. Hence the application of the parol evidence rule to a waiver
will exclude all waivers made prior to or contemporaneous with the insurance contract. Union Mutual Ins. Co. v. Mowry, 96 U. S. 544 (1877);
Colmenson v. Ins. Co., 92 Minn. 390, 100 N. W. 88 (1904); PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW

(1935) p. 450. But in attempting to raise an

estoppel, however, the insured does not contradict the terms of the policy
and it is said that "the so-called parol testimony rule has no application
to estoppel, -which is a remedial process of equitable origin, grounded upon
inequitable conduct and collateral to the contract." VANcE, supra, at 528.
The leading case on the subject of estoppel is Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Wilkinson, 13 Wall. 222 (U. S. 1871). Hence the distinction appears to be
vital where the parol evidence rule is concerned. Necessity for further
distinction between the operation of waiver and estoppel will appear

infra.

"PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW (1935) p. 415.

"McElroy v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 84 Neb. 866, 122 N. W. 27 (1909); Black v.
Atlantic Home Ins. Co., 148 N. C. 169, 61 S. E. 672 (1908).
'N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Fletcher, 117 U. S. 519 (1886); -Gould v. Ins. Co.,
90 Mich. 302, 51 N. W. 455 (1892).
"See discussion on this point in Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co. v. Norton,
96 U. S. 234 (1877).
"Generally the clause is not broad enough to prevent knowledge acquired by the agent from being imputed to the company. Also the nonwaiver clause will not apply to the post-casual conditions. See PATTERSON, op. cit. supra, note 44, at 463.
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side of the question of the limited authority of the agent, the rule in
the Hayes case has little bearing in cases of waiver, for ordinarily both
49
parties have actual knowledge of the right waived.
But this will not follow in a claim of estoppel by the insured, since
in estoppel the limitations upon the agent's power to bind the insurer
have no necessary application. It is said that in the estoppel situation
the agent is not making agreements for his principal, but is serving him
ministerially, doing acts which the principal has undertaken to perform, so that if the acts of the agent alleged to create an estoppel
were done in the course of his employment in the conduct of his
principal's business, the principal is legally bound by them even though
they were expressly forbidden.50 Hence, if the agent is authorized to
talk or act for the insurer in any capacity, he may estop the insurer.
Thus, while there may not be a waiver asserted in certain situations
where the application contains a non-waiver clause, there still may
be an estoppel, since even actual knowledge by insured of the limited
authority of the agent should not prevent the insured from raising
an estoppel. 51
The Hayes rule is important in the estoppel situation because an
essential requirement in the assertion of estoppel is the justifiable
reliance of the insured. If he has actual knowledge that the representation made by the insurer, or his agent, is untrue, he will be precluded
from relying thereon and hence cannot raise an estoppel against the
insured.5 2 The cases, however, require an actual knowledge and it is
said generally that constructive or imputed knowledge is not sufficient,53 the mere fact that the insured has the means of learning the

truth for himself does not deprive him of the privilege of relying upon
the insurer's representation. 4 This rule brings one face to face with
the doctrine invoked by the Hayes case that the insured is presumed
to know the contents of his policy. Will such presumed knowledge
preclude the insured from setting up an estoppel of the insurer?
°:BOWERs, LAW OF WAIVER

(1914) pp. 256-341.

OSouthern States Ins. Co. v. Vann, 69 Fla. 549, 68 So. 647 (1915), L. R. A.
1916B 1189; Phenix Ins. Co. v. Hart, 149 Ill. 513, 36 N. E. 990 (1894); Wood
v. Amer. Fire Ins. Co., 149 N. Y. 382, 44 N. E. 80 (1896). See also VANcE,
op.5 cit. supra, note 44, at 534.
1'This is true since the insurer may be estopped by his agent who is

simply acting within the course of his employment regardless of the fact

that his authority to do certain specific acts is limited. See note 50, supra.
"'Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hilton Green, 241 U. S. 613 (1916); Mudge
v. Sup. Ct. I. 0. F., 149 Mich. 467, 112 N. W. 1130, 14 L. R. A. (N.s.) 279
(1907); Haapa v. Met. Life Ins. Co, 150 Mich. 467, 114 N. W. 380 (1907);
Bratley v. B. 0. A. Y., 159 Minn. 14, 198 N. W. 128 (1924).
"Back v. Peoples Nat. Fire Ins. Co., 97 Conn. 336, 116 Ati. 603 (1922);
Roe v. Nat. Life Ins. Assn., 137 Iowa 696, 115 N. W. 500, 17 L. R. A. (N.s.)
1144 (1908); Pfiester v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 85 Kan. 97, 116 Pac. 245
(1911); Arneberg v. Cont. Gas. Co., 178 Wis. 428, 190 N. W. 97, 29 A. L. R.
93 (1922).
4

" VANCE,

op. cit. supra, note 44, at 525.
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In view of the general rule that there must be actual knowledge, it
is submitted that the Hayes rule should not go this far. Although
there are no Washington cases directly raising this issue, there are
decisions rendered by the Washington court which may shed some
light on the question. In the case of Turner v. American Casualty Co.5
the applicant for accident insurance told the agent that he had an
"atrophied leg", the agent, however, wrote in the application that he
had "no bodily infirmity". All the answers given by the insured were
truthful and complete. The court permitted recovery by the insured
on this policy on the ground that a policy will not be held void for a
cause known to the agent before the application was signed, citing
many Washington cases and concluding:
"The underlying principle of these cases is that the knowledge of the agent is the knowledge of the principal, without
regard to whether the agent communicates the facts to it;
that where the insured makes full and truthful statements to
the agent who procures the policy of insurance, the insurer
will be held to have 'waived' the written warranties in so far
as they are not in harmony with the facts disclosed...,56
Whether the insurer "waived" the written warranties or was estopped
to assert them seems of no concern to the court here, but the result
was an equitable estoppel and not a true waiver. The court ignored
the possibility that the insured might have had implied knowledge
of the breach in the application and, in the absence of actual knowledge, seemed perfectly willing to estop the insurer from setting up a
defense of fraudulent concealment or a breach of warranty. In a
later decision, 57 the court clarified its position, somewhat, in a case involving substantially similar facts, saying:
"the respondent (insured) and his agents were wholly without knowledge of what the application contained on the subject, were entirely without responsibility for the misrepresentation . . .,58

The facts in this case were similar in one particular to those in the
5'69 Wash. 154, 124 Pac. 486 (1912).
"Id. at 160, 124 Pac. at 489. The Washington court has often held that
the knowledge of the agent is the knowledge of the company under these
circumstances and has denied the insurer the use of these false statements
as a defense on the basis of estoppel See Mesterman v. Home Mutual
Ins. Co., 5 Wash. 524, 32 Pac. 458 (1893); Foster v. Pioneer Mut..Ins. Assn.,
37 Wash. 288, 79 Pac. 798 (1905); Staats v. Pioneer Ins. Assn., 55 Wash. 51,
104 Pac. 185 (1909); Brigham v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 95 Wash. 196, 163
Pac. 380 (1917); Workman v. Royal Exchange Assur., 96 Wash. 559, 165
Pac. 488 (1917); Robbins v. Milwaukee Mech. Ins. Co., 102 Wash. 539, 173
Pac. 634 (1918); Stebbins v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 115 Wash. 623, 197
Pac. 913 (1921); Eaton v. Nat. Cas. Co., 122 Wash. 477, 210 Pac. 779 (1922);
Small v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 144 Wash. 523, 258 Pac. 33 (1927); Tison
v. American Nat. Ins. Co., 163 Wash. 522, 1 P. (2d) 859, 3 P. (2d) 998
(1931).
"Small v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 144 Wash. 523, 258 Pac. 33 (1927).
"Id.at 526, 258 Pac. at 34.
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Hayes case in that the insured never had actual possession of the
policy, yet in this case the court indulged in no presumption of knowledge of the contents of the policy and application attached and permitted the insured to raise an estoppel.
There is, furthermore, a line of Washington cases which holds that
where the insurer's agent fails to inquire as to some material fact
and writes in a false answer in respect thereto, the insurer will thereafter be estopped from asserting a breach of warranty by the insured. 9
In these cases the court, in each instance, permitted the operation of
an estoppel even though the insured had failed to read his policy and
application attached, whereby he would have discovered the untruthful
statements. In one of these cases so holding the issue of the Hayes
case was brought squarely before the court by the dissenting judge,
contending:
"It was his legal duty to read his policy, to know what it
contained. If a party may escape the obligation of one kind
of a written contract to which he is a party by saying he
never read it and didn't know its contents, why may he not
likewise escape the binding force of any written contract?" 0
Unfortunately, whatever clarification that may be derived from the
language of the court in these cases, the question has been put in utter
confusion by a recent holding of the Washington court in the case of
Perry v. Continental Insurance Company.8' There, the insured recovered a verdict of the jury and judgment in the lower court on evidence that although in applying for fire insurance on her dwelling
house in Anacortes she told the agent that she never had had a fire
in Anacortes, but had suffered one in a dwelling house in Grays Harbor,
"Gregerson v. Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 99 Wash. 639, 170 Pac. 331 (1918),
where the agent failed to inquire at all as to the state of the title of
property to be insured against fire. The policy, however, contained a
clause avoiding the coverage if the insured did not have fee simple title.
Insured's house was on leased ground. Insured did not make any misrepresentation or intentionally conceal the state of title; he failed to read the
policy and yet was allowed to recover on the ground that the insurer was
required to ask about the title or be estopped from asserting the clause.
This ruling goes far, it seems, since it is difficult to find the requisite
knowledge in the insurer for the basis of the estoppel.
Neher v. Western Assurance Co., 40 Wash. 157, 82 Pac. 166 (1905),
wherein the insured's title was covered by a mortgage and again the
policy contained an avoidance clause. The insurer's agent failed to inquire
and the insured made no misrepresentation. Held: For insured since insurer was estopped.
Foster v. Pioneer Mutual Ins. Assn., 37 Wash. 288, 79 Pac. 798 (1905),
where the insured stated the exact truth to the agent who inserted false
answers in the application, which the insured signed on the agent's
assurance that it was correct. The insured did not read the policy, yet
the court raised an estoppel against the insurer even though the insured
would have discovered the false answer if he had read the policy.
*'Neher v. Western Assurance Co., 40 Wash. 157, 159, 82 Pac. 166, 167
(1905).
°178 Wash. 24, 33 P. (2d) 661 (1934).
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nevertheless the agent wrote in the application that insured had had
no prior fire loss. She signed the application, failed to read it, and on
a subsequent loss by fire sued on the policy. The supreme court reversed the lower court's finding and dismissed the action, citing the
Hayes case, saying:
"It is the general rule and the same is applicable to the
case at bar, that a party to a contract or representation to
which he has affixed his signature will not be permitted to urge
that he did not read it and that he was ignorant of its contents, and supposed them to conform to what he had agreed
with or represented to the adverse party or her agent."82
It seems, after the long line of Washington decisions stating that the
knowledge of the agent is that of the insurer,68 that this holding of
the court, reversing as a matter of law the finding of the jury, is an
unwarranted extension of the Hayes rule. While the court did not
specifically mention an estoppel of the insurer, in substance it denies
the raising of such an estoppel solely on the implied and constructive
knowledge of the insured. The court found that the insured made
the 'misrepresentation" with intent to deceive in the face of the fact
that insured had told the agent the true nature of the facts, which
seems a remarkable result in view of previous holdings. Such a holding
seems to give preference to the constructive knowledge derived from
the presumption that the insured read his policy, over the fact that
actually there was no knowledge in the mind of the insured at all!
It is submitted that this view is contrary to the purpose and spirit
of estoppel which is founded purely on equitable principles of fairness.
While it would be unconscionable for the insured to "rely" on a known
false statement, such reliance is not unconscionable unless there is
actual knowledge of the falsity. Unconscionable conduct depends
upon the state of mind of the actor, and it cannot be said that imputed
knowledge will create that necessary state of mind. This doctrine of
imputed knowledge is a fiction at best and when applied to estoppel
often substitutes the fiction for truth in that a person is frequently
conclusively presumed to know what in fact he actually did not
know.
What the future holds for the Hayes rule is a matter of conjecture.
In view of the recent decisions the court seems well on the way to
confusion. Although the court has not expressly declared a denial
of former rulings, in substance and result this is what it has done. But
in the absence of an express commitment, it seems that there is yet
time for the Washington court to retrace its recent steps and enunciate
a rule that will fall in line with the uniform and the more sensible
-id. at 28, 33 P. (2d) at 662.
=See note 56, supra.
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rule. Perhaps it is not so much the rule itself as the application of
it, that should be remedied. The Contract Rule should be properly
applied to the insurance contract as in any contract. However, this
application must be cautiously made in at least four instances. Firstly,
in view of the Washington statute avoiding a policy when based on a
representation or warranty made with an intent to deceive, the presumption that the insured knows the contents of his contract should
not alone form the basis for this inference of intent. Only actual knowledge should be the criterion. Secondly, in the reformation cases, failure
to read the policy should not constitute such negligence as to deny
reformation. Reformation should be denied in these cases only when
the insured's failure to read has resulted in injury to insurer or prejudiced the insurer in some way that would make the relief inequitable.
Thirdly, the Hayes rule will not or should not have any substantial
bearing in the cases of waiver. Finally, in the cases of estoppel, there
is the same problem of implied knowledge as raised in the intent to
deceive situation. Here the Hayes rule clearly should not be applied
to deny an estoppel, since, as pointed out, the result is to deny equity
rather than do equity. It is submitted that if the contract rule applied
to the insurance cases were subjected to these limitations, it would
have a salutory effect on this field of insurance law in Washington.

